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Abstract
Large data collections required for the training
of neural networks often contain sensitive infor-
mation such as the medical histories of patients,
and the privacy of the training data must be pre-
served. In this paper, we introduce a dropout
technique that provides an elegant Bayesian in-
terpretation to dropout, and show that the intrin-
sic noise added, with the primary goal of regu-
larization, can be exploited to obtain a degree
of differential privacy. The iterative nature of
training neural networks presents a challenge for
privacy-preserving estimation since multiple iter-
ations increase the amount of noise added. We
overcome this by using a relaxed notion of dif-
ferential privacy, called concentrated differential
privacy, which provides tighter estimates on the
overall privacy loss. We demonstrate the accu-
racy of our privacy-preserving dropout algorithm
on benchmark datasets.
1 Introduction
Deep neural networks (DNN) have recently generated sig-
nificant interest, largely due to their successes in several
important learning applications, including image classifica-
tion, languagemodeling andmanymore (e.g., [Lecun et al.,
1998, Maddison et al., 2014, Vinyals et al., 2015]). The
success of neural networks is directly related to the avail-
ability of large and representative datasets for training.
However, these datasets are often collected from individ-
uals, such as their tastes and behavior as well as medical
health records, and present obvious privacy issues. Their
usage requires methods that provide precise privacy guar-
antees while meeting the demands of the applications.
Overfitting is a key challenge in training deep neural net-
works, since DNNs can model highly complex prediction
functions using a large number of parameters. It is often
difficult to optimize these functions due to the potentially
large number of local minimas in the space of parame-
ters, and standard optimization techniques are prone to get-
ting stuck in a local minimum which might be far from
the global optimum. A popular regularization technique
to avoid such local minima is dropout [Hinton et al., 2012,
Wang and Manning, 2013, Srivastava et al., 2014] which
introduces noise into a model and optimizes loss func-
tion. Recently, it was shown that dropout can be treated
as a Bayesian regularization method [Kingma et al., 2015,
Gal and Ghahramani, 2015] and it can be used to tune each
weight’s individual dropout rates. Besides its primary ob-
jective of regularization, dropout can be used to hide the
details of the training data for achieving privacy. The key
purpose of this paper is to analyze dropout in order to pro-
vide a theoretical guarantee for the privacy protection of the
deep neural networks.
We develop a differentially private dropout technique by
exploiting the inherent randomization of the dropout. Dif-
ferential privacy (DP) is currently a widely accepted pri-
vacy definition [Dwork, 2006] to formalize the privacy pro-
tection of algorithms. The main principle of DP is to en-
sure that an adversary should not be able to reliably in-
fer whether or not a particular individual is participating
in a database, even with unlimited computational power
and access to every entry except for that particular indi-
vidual’s data. This can be accomplished through adding
noise into an algorithm at different stages such as adding
noise to data itself or changing the objective function to
be optimized. In order to design efficient differentially
private algorithms, one needs to design a noise injection
mechanism such that there is a good trade-off between
privacy and utility. However, iterative algorithms such
as stochastic gradient descent (SGD) accumulate the pri-
vacy loss at each iteration and a large number of iterations
cause high cumulative privacy loss because of the poten-
tial of each access to leak more information. Therefore,
we employ zCDP composition analysis [Bun and Steinke,
2016] that is inspired by concentrated differential privacy
(CDP) [Dwork and Rothblum, 2016] which is a recently
proposed DP concept. CDP is well suited for iterative al-
gorithms since it provides high probability bounds for cu-
mulative privacy loss and requires adding much less noise
for the same expected privacy guarantee compared to the
DP.
In this paper, we study Gaussian dropout in the case we
tune individual dropout rates for each weight of neural net-
work to provide measurable privacy guarantee. Our main
contributions can be summarized as follows:
• We first use the recently proposed connection between
Gaussian dropout and Stochastic Gradient Langevin
Dynamics (SGLD) [Li et al., 2016], and then analyze
that under what conditions dropout ensures to protect
the privacy of the training data of DNNs.
• In order to use the privacy budget more efficiently over
many iterations, our approach uses the zCDP compo-
sition combined with the privacy amplification effect
due to subsampling of data, which significantly de-
creases the amount of additive noise for the same ex-
pected privacy guarantee compared to the standard DP
analysis.
• We empirically show that for general single hidden
layer neural network models, dropout helps to regular-
ize network and improves prediction accuracy while
providing (ǫ, δ)-DP and zCDP. As our experiments il-
lustrate, dropoutwith zCDP outperforms both the stan-
dard DP and the state-of-the-art algorithms, especially
when the privacy budget is low.
2 Related Work
There are a number of works that address deep learning un-
der differential privacy. Recently, [Shokri and Shmatikov,
2015] designed a system that enables multiple parties to
train a neural network model without sharing their datasets.
[Phan et al., 2016] introduced a different approach towards
differentially private deep learning that focuses on learn-
ing autoencoders by perturbing the objective functions of
them. [Papernot et al., 2016] proposed a method where
privacy-preservingmodels are learned locally from disjoint
datasets and then combined in a privacy-preserving fash-
ion. [Jain et al., 2015] used dropout to protect privacy in a
completely different setting. They use binary dropout that
cannot be converted to additive noise; so they add Laplace
noise to the objective function to determine the dropping
nodes from the network. Namely, they cannot use the in-
trinsic noise of the dropout. In addition, they use a different
notion of DP, which is local-DP [Duchi et al., 2013]. Most
recently, [Phan et al., 2017] developed a Laplace mecha-
nism to preserve differential privacy in deep learning. This
mechanism is independent of the number of training epochs
in consuming privacy budget and it intentionally adds more
(Laplace) noise into input features which are less relevant
to the model output, and vice-versa.
Our work is most closely related to the study in
[Abadi et al., 2016]. In this work, they developed the mo-
ments accountant method, which is closely related to the
notion of concentrated-DP, to accumulate the privacy cost
that provides a tighter bound for privacy loss than previous
composition methods. Then, by using the moments accoun-
tant they propose a differentially private SGD algorithm to
train a neural network by perturbing the gradients of pa-
rameters in SGD. The gradients are perturbed by adding
Gaussian distribution noise separately. The addition of
noise is a common technique for achieving privacy and also
a common technique in deep learning [Neelakantan et al.,
2015, Abadi et al., 2016]. In our work, we show that
there is a one to one relation between dropout rate and
the Gaussian noise, so we say that dropout preserves (ǫ,
δ)-DP in each DNN model for free when we calibrate the
dropout rate carefully. Conversely, the amount of noise
computed to provide (ǫ, δ)-DP also finds a proper dropout
rate. We exploit the intrinsic randomized noise of the
dropout by using two connections: i) Dropout and SGLD
and ii) SGLD and DP. Besides, we apply the concentrated
DP [Dwork and Rothblum, 2016, Bun and Steinke, 2016],
which obtains equally tight bounds with the moments ac-
countant but easier to convert into DP, to gradient pertur-
bation mechanism. Then, we derive similar bounds to
the moments accountant to strengthen the privacy guaran-
tee in DNNs. Finally, we result in a similar algorithm
with [Abadi et al., 2016], but showing this similarity in the
end is exactly the main goal of our paper.
3 Notations and Background
Throughout this paper, we assume that the data is D =
{di}Ni=1 where di = (xi, yi), with input object/feature xi ∈
RD and output label yi ∈ Y , with Y being the output dis-
crete label space. A model characterizes the relationship
from x to y with parameters (or weights) θ. Our goal is
to tune the parameters θ of a model p(y|x, θ) that predicts
y given x and θ. Bayesian inference in such a model con-
sists of updating some initial belief over parameters θ in
the form of a prior distribution p(θ), after observing data
D, into an updated belief over these parameters in the form
of the posterior distribution p(θ|D). The posterior distribu-
tion of a set ofN items is p(θ|D) ∝ p(θ) p(D|θ) where the
corresponding data likelihood is p(D|θ) =∏Ni=1 p(di|θ).
Computing the posterior is often difficult in practice as it
requires the computation of analytically intractable inte-
grals, so we need to use approximation techniques. One
of such techniques is Stochastic Gradient Langevin dynam-
ics (SGLD) [Welling and Teh, 2011] that is used to scale up
Bayesian learning by combining a popular class of methods
called stochastic optimization [Robbins and Monro, 1951]
and Markov chain Monte Carlo [Robert and Casella, 2005]
that generates a sequence of samples from a Markov chain.
3.1 SGLD
Stochastic sampling methods such as
SGLD [Welling and Teh, 2011] incorporate uncertainty
into predictive estimates by running a perturbed version of
the minibatch stochastic gradient descent on the negative
log-posterior objective function:
L(θ) = − log p(θ)−
N
S
∑
i∈St
log p(dti |θ)
At each iteration t, a subset of S < N data items St =
{dt1 , · · · , dtS} is given and a Gaussian noise is injected
during parameter updates so that they do not collapse to
just the MAP solution. The parameters are updated as:
θt+1 ← θt + ηt
2
∇θt + ζt , ζt ∼ N (0, ηtI)
where {ηt} is a sequence of step sizes and I is the iden-
tity matrix. To ensure convergence to a local maximum, a
major requirement is for the step sizes to satisfy the prop-
erties:
∑∞
t=1 ηt = ∞ and
∑∞
t=1 η
2
t < ∞. Given a set
of samples from the update rule, posterior distributions
can be approximated via Monte Carlo approximations as
p(y|x,D) ≈ 1T
∑T
t=1 p(y|x, θt), where T is the number of
samples.
3.2 Differential Privacy
A natural notion of privacy protection prevents inference
about specific records by requiring a randomized query re-
sponse mechanism that yields similar distributions on re-
sponses of similar datasets. Formally, for any two possi-
ble input datasets D and D′ with the edit distance or Ham-
ming distance d(D,D′) = 1, and any subset of possible
responses R, a randomized algorithm A satisfies (ǫ, δ) dif-
ferential privacy if
P (A(D) ∈ R) ≤ eǫP (A(D′) ∈ R) + δ (1)
(ǫ, δ)-differential privacy ensures that for all adjacentD,D′,
the absolute value of the privacy loss will be bounded by ǫ
with probability at least 1 − δ. Here, ǫ controls the maxi-
mum amount of information gain about an individual’s data
given the output of the algorithm. When the positive param-
eter ǫ is smaller, the mechanism provides stronger privacy
guarantee [Dwork, 2006].
3.3 Concentrated Differential Privacy (CDP)
CDP is a recent variation of differential privacy which is
proposed to make privacy-preserving iterative algorithms
more practical than DP while still providing strong privacy
guarantees. The CDP framework treats the privacy loss of
an outcome, L(o)(A(D)‖A(D′)) = log
P (A(D)=o)
P (A(D′)=o) as a random
variable. Two CDP methods are proposed in the literature.
The first one is (µ, τ )-mCDP [Dwork and Rothblum, 2016]
where µ is the mean of this privacy loss. After subtracting
µ from the resulting random variable L(o) is subgaussian
with standard deviation τ , i.e. ∀λ ∈ R: E
[
eλ(L
(o)−µ)
]
≤
eλ
2τ2/2. The second one is τ -zCDP [Bun and Steinke,
2016] and we first define the Rényi divergence between two
probability distribution in order to define it.
Definition 1 (Rényi Divergence): Let P1 and P2 be prob-
ability distributions. For α ∈ (1,∞), the Rényi Divergence
is defined of order α of P1 from P2 as:
Dα(P1 ‖ P2) =
1
α− 1
log
(
E
x∼P1
[(
P1(x)
P2(x)
)(α−1)])
τ -zCDP [Bun and Steinke, 2016] arises from a connec-
tion between the moment generating function of L(o) and
the Rényi divergence between the distributions of A(D)
and A(D′). We require: e(α−1)Dα = E
[
e(α−1)L
(o)
]
≤
e(α−1)ατ , ∀α ∈ (1,∞). Observe that in this case L(o) is
also subgaussian but zero-mean.
The zCDP definition is a relaxation of mCDP. In particu-
lar, a (µ, τ)-mCDP mechanism is also (µ − τ2/2, τ2/2)-
zCDP, but the opposite is not correct. Besides, zCDP can
be thought of as providing guarantees of (ǫ, δ)-DP for all
values of δ > 0 (It will be shown in detail in Section 4).
Accordingly, most of the DP mechanisms and applications
can be characterized in terms of zCDP, but not in terms of
mCDP, so we use zCDP as a tool for analyzing composition
under the (ǫ, δ)-DP privacy definition, for a fair comparison
between CDP and DP analyses.
3.4 Dropout
Dropout is one of the most popular regularization tech-
niques for neural networks which injects multiplicative ran-
dom noise to the input of each layer during the training
procedure. For a fully connected neural network, the for-
malization of dropout is denoted as:
h2 = w((ξ ◦ θ)h1) with ξi,j ∼ p(ξi,j) (2)
where h1 and h2 are the consecutive layers, θ is the weight
matrix for the current layer and w(·) is the nonlinear func-
tion. The ⊙ symbol denotes the elementwise (Hadamard)
product of the input matrix with a matrix of independent
noise variables ξ. The previous publications [Hinton et al.,
2012, Wan et al., 2013, Srivastava et al., 2014] show that
the weight parameters θ are less likely to overfit to the
training data by adding noise to the input or weights dur-
ing optimization. At first, Hinton et al. [Hinton et al.,
2012] proposed the Binary Dropout where the elements
of ξ are drawn from a Bernoulli distribution with param-
eter 1 − p, hence each element of the input matrix is put
to zero with probability p that is also known as dropout
rate. Afterwards, the same authors proposed the Gaussian
Dropout using continuous noise ξi,j ∼ N (1, α = p1−p )
with same relative mean and variance works as well or bet-
ter [Srivastava et al., 2014].
4 Methodology
We describe our approach toward differentially private
training of neural networks and introduce the proposed dif-
ferentially private dropout algorithm. We first define the
connection between dropout and SGLD by replacing the
multiplicative noise term of dropout with an additive noise
term. Then, we present our dropout algorithm and compute
the per-iteration privacy budget for both advanced compo-
sition and zCDP composition.
4.1 Connection between dropout and SGLD
Dropout has been proposed to improve model general-
ization in neural networks by adding noise to the lo-
cal units or global weights during training. In [Li et al.,
2016], Molchanov et al proved that the Stochastic Gradient
MCMC model learning provides a Bayesian interpretation
for dropout [Wan et al., 2013]. We have the update rule
that shares the same form as SGLD by combining the SGD
update with Gaussian dropout:
θt+1 =
(
ξ ◦ θt
)
+
ηt
2
∇θg (3)
= θt +
ηt
2
∇θg + ξ′ (4)
where ξ′ ∼ N (0, ηtV ) and V = αηt diag(θ2t ). At each
step, the gradient∇θg = ∇L(θ) is computed for a random
subset of examples as:
∇θg = ∇θ log p(θt) + N
S
∑
i∈St
∇θ log p(dti |θt) (5)
In this way, we replace the multiplicative noise term ξ in
Eq.(3) with an additive noise term ξ′ in Eq.(4) and it can
be interpreted as injected noise from the Brownian motion
of Langevin dynamics. The additive noise also helps us to
propose a dropout algorithm that satisfies the differential
privacy definition by adding independent Gaussian noise to
the updates of each weight.
4.2 Differentially Private Dropout (DPD)
Eq.(4) is used to learn and regularize the model by adding
random noise ξ′. Our idea is to tune the noise term to
provide privacy protection while keeping an acceptable
dropout rate α to improve the model. To protect the pri-
vacy of training data, we need to perturb the gradients with
a Gaussian noise in each iteration. We use the existing
random noise ξ′ ∼ N (0, ηtV ) that is already being used
for regularization where V = αηt diag(θ
2
t ) and eventually it
equals to ξ′ ∼ N (0, α diag(θ2t )).
In the original method [Li et al., 2016], the authors consid-
ered the case when there is a single α for the model and
the noise is controlled by it. In our case, at each iteration
of the training scheme, DPD takes a minibatch of data and
computes the gradient, clips the L2 norm of each gradient
and adds noise to the gradient to protect privacy. The noisy
stochastic gradient is then used to update model parame-
ters θ via SGLD method by iteratively applying the update
equation (4). The algorithm requires several parameters to
determine the privacy budget such as sampling frequency
ν = S/N for subsampling within the dataset, a total num-
ber of iterations T and clipping threshold C. Clipping the
gradients using the threshold C will lead L2 sensitivity of
gradient sum to be 2C. We have chosen to perturb parame-
ter updates with zero mean multivariate normal noise with
covariance matrix (2C)2σ2I. Parameter σ in noise level de-
termines our total ǫ and the amount of noise is chosen to
be equal to the ξ′ ∼ N (0, 4C2σ2I). This amount is equal
to the ξ′ ∼ N (0, α diag(θ2t )), hence α can be obtained
by using this equality after determining the noise level that
preserves ǫ-DP. Here, α is not fixed for each weight and is
controlled by the noise level that protects ǫ-DP. Algorithm 1
outlines our method for training a model with parameters
θ. In the next subsection, we describe in detail how privacy
design parameters are chosen and privacy budget is calcu-
lated.
Algorithm 1 Differentially Private Dropout (DPD)
1: Inputs: Input data D = {xi, yi}Ni=1, number of data
passes T , minibatch size S, learning rate ηt, noise scale
σ, gradient norm bound C.
2: Initialize θ0 randomly
3: for t← 1 to T do
4: Take a random sample St of size S with sampling
probability ν = S/N
5: Compute gradient∇θg from (xi, yi) ∈ St
6: Clip gradient: ∇θ g¯ = ∇θg/max
(
1, ‖ ∇θg ‖2/C
)
7: Compute noise: ξ′ ∼ N (0, 4C2σ2I)
8: Update parameter: θt+1 = θt +
ηt
2 (∇θ g¯ + ξ′)
9: end for
10: Output: θT .
4.3 Per-iteration privacy budget
When developing a differentially private algorithm, we en-
counter a challenge that the number of iterations accumu-
lates the privacy loss at each access to the training data, and
the number of iterations required to guarantee accurate pos-
terior estimates causes high cumulative privacy loss. In or-
der to use the privacy budget more effectively across many
iterations, one needs to calculate the privacy cost by using
an enhanced composition analysis.
In this work, we first calculate the per-iteration privacy
budget using the key properties of advanced composition
theorem (Theorem 3.20 of [Dwork and Roth, 2014]) and
this method is called DPD-AC in the experiments. Then,
we use a relaxed notion of differential privacy, called
zCDP [Bun and Steinke, 2016] that bounds the moments of
the privacy loss random variable and call this methodDPD-
zCDP. The moments bound yields a tighter tail bound, and
consequently, it allows for a higher per-iteration budget
than standard DP-methods for a given total privacy budget.
Theorem 1 (Advanced composition): For all ǫ, δ, δ′ ≥
0, the class of (ǫ, δ)-DP mechanisms satisfy (ǫtot, δtot)-DP
under k-fold adaptive composition for
ǫtot =
√
2k log(1/δ′)ǫ+ kǫ(eǫ − 1) , δtot = kδ + δ′
Remark 1 (Remark 1 in [Wang et al., 2015]): When ǫ =
c√
2k log(1/δ′)
< 1 for some constant c <
√
log(1/δ′), the
equation of ǫ′ can be simplified into ǫ′ ≤ 2c by applying
the inequality eǫ − 1 ≤ 2ǫ.
The theorem states that with small ǫ and small loss in δtot,
more strict ǫtot is obtained than just summing the ǫ. This
is clear by looking at the first order expansion for small ǫ
(Taylor Theorem is used with assumption that ǫ ≤ 1) of
ǫtot =
√
2k log(1/δ′)ǫ+ kǫ2.
There are many ways to make an algorithm differentially
private. In this paper, we add differential privacy into Gaus-
sian dropout by clipping and perturbing the gradients. As
our method for perturbation, we use a specific form of
the global sensitivity method, called the Gaussian Mech-
anism [Dwork, 2006], where Gaussian noise calibrated to
the global sensitivity is added.
Theorem 2 (Gaussian Mechanism (GM),
in [Dwork and Roth, 2014]): Let ǫ ∈ (0, 1) be
arbitrary. Gaussian Mechanism states that given
function f with L2 sensitivity of △2f , releasing
f(X) + Z where Z ∼ N (0, σ2) is (ǫ, δ)-DP when
σ ≥ △2f
√
2 log(1.25/δ)/ǫ.
Given two adjacent datasets D and D′, the important L2-
sensitivity of a function f is defined as:
△2f = sup
D,D′,‖D−D′‖=1
‖ f(D)− f(D′) ‖2
We use a stochastic gradient algorithm that uses mini-
batches of data while learning, so we can make use of the
amplifying effect of the subsampling on privacy. The ver-
sion of the privacy amplification theorem we use is as fol-
lows:
Theorem 3 (Theorem 1 in [Li et al., 2012]): Any (ǫiter,
δiter)-DP mechanism running on a sampled subset of the
data, where each data point is included independently with
probability ν, and where ν > δiter , guarantees (log(1 +
ν(exp(ǫiter)− 1)), νδiter)-DP.
We will assume that the instances are included indepen-
dently with probability ν = S/N ; and for ease of imple-
mentation, we will use minibatches with fixed size S in
our experiments. As we mentioned before, parameter σ in
noise level determines our total ǫ and depends on the total
δ in privacy budget. We can calculate by the total privacy
budget ǫtot by setting σ =
√
2 log(1.25/δiter)/ǫiter. Clip-
ping will lead L2 sensitivity of gradient sum to be 2C, so
perturbing each sum with aforementioned noise will lead
each iteration to be (ǫiter,δiter)-DP w.r.t the subset. Now
if we set δiter = (δtot − δ′)/Tν, where δ′ comes from ad-
vanced composition, we can provide δtot as δ parameter in
total privacy cost. Using Theorem 1 and Theorem 2, the ǫ
parameter in our total privacy cost for DPD-AC will be:
ǫtot =
√
2T log(1/δ′)/σ′ + T (σ′)2 where
σ′ = log
(
1 + ν
(
exp(
√
2 log(1.25/δiter)/σ)− 1
))
CDP: ForDPD-zCDP, we calculate the per-iteration bud-
get using the zCDP composition that is used for tracking
privacy loss of the composite mechanisms. It permits a
sharper analysis of the per-iteration privacy budget. We
first convert DP to zCDP, then use the zCDP composition.
For comparison purposes, we convert zCDP back to DP at
the end. We use the following lemmas and propositions for
this process:
Proposition 1 (Proposition 1.6 in [Bun and Steinke,
2016]): The Gaussian mechanism with some noise
variance τ and a sensitivity△ satisfies△2/(2τ)-zCDP.
Lemma 1 (Lemma 1.7 in [Bun and Steinke, 2016]): If
two mechanisms satisfy ρ1-zCDP and ρ2-zCDP, respec-
tively, then their composition satisfies (ρ1 + ρ2)-zCDP.
Proposition 2 (Proposition 1.3 in [Bun and Steinke,
2016]): If A provides ρ-zCDP, then A is
(ρ+ 2
√
ρ log(1/δ), δ)-DP
Using Proposition 1 and Lemma 1, we obtain T △2 /(2τ)-
zCDP after T -composition of the Gaussian mechanism.
Using Proposition 2, we convert T △2 /(2τ)-zCDP to
(ρ+2
√
ρ log(1/δ), δ)-DP where ρ = T△2 /(2τ). We will
summarize these seemingly complicated process under two
straightforward steps: i) zCDP composition and ii) privacy
amplification.
zCDP composition: Given a total privacy budget ǫtot and
total tolerance level δtot, our algorithm computes a privacy
budget using the zCDP composition, which maps (ǫtot,
δtot) to (ǫ′, δ′) as:
ǫtot = J △
2 /(2τ ) + 2
√
J △2 /(2τ ) log(1/δtot), (6)
where τ ≥ 2 log(1.25/δ′)△2 /ǫ′
2
Privacy amplification: Our algorithm computes the per-
iteration privacy budget (ǫiter, δiter) using the privacy am-
plification theorem, which maps (ǫ′,δ′) to (ǫiter, δiter):
ǫ′ = log(1 + ν(exp(ǫiter)− 1)), δ
′ = νδiter (7)
5 Experiments and Results
We evaluate our approach on two standard benchmark
datasets: MNIST [Lecun et al., 1998] that contains 70K
28 × 28 handwritten digits (60K for training and 10K for
testing) and DIGITS [Bache and Lichman, 2013] that con-
sists of 1797 8 × 8 grayscale images (1439 for training
and 360 for testing) of handwritten digits. We use a sin-
gle layer feed-forward neural network with ReLU units
and softmax of 10 classes for both datasets. We choose
the non-private (NP) model as our baseline. For MNIST,
we use the minibatch of size S = 600 with 1000 hid-
den units and reach an accuracy of 98.20% in about 200
epochs. For DIGITS, we use the minibatch of size S = 100
with 500 hidden units and reach an accuracy of 95.50% in
about 100 epochs. All of the results are implemented in
Theano [Theano Development Team, 2016] and are the av-
erage of 10 runs.
Differentially private models: We experiment with the
same architecture for the differentially private version. To
limit sensitivity, we clip the gradient norm of each layer at
C = 3 for MNIST and C = 2 for DIGITS. We report re-
sults for three different noise levels where ǫ = {10, 1, 0.5}.
For any fixed ǫ, δ is varied between 10−2 and 10−5. There
is a slight difference with different δ values (less than
10−3), but still we choose the best performing δ = 10−4
for both datasets. We set the initial learning rate η0 = 0.1
for MNIST and η0 = 0.05 for DIGITS and update it per
round as ηt = η0/tγ . We fixed the decay rate γ to 1 for
both of the datasets.
In the first set of experiments, we investigate the influence
of privacy loss on accuracy. The mini-batch sizes were
set to S = 600 and S = 100 for MNIST and DIGITS re-
spectively. We ran the algorithm for 200 passes for MNIST
and 100 passes for DIGITS. Figure 1(a), 1(d) report the
performance of the DPD-AC method and Figure 1(b), 1(e)
report the performance of the DPD-zCDPmethod for differ-
ent noise levels. These results justify the theoretical claims
that lower prediction accuracy is obtained when the privacy
protection is increased by decreasing ǫ. One more deduc-
tion from these results is that dropout with the zCDP com-
position (DPD-zCDP method) can reach an accuracy very
close to the non-private level especially under reasonably
strong privacy guarantees (when ǫ > 0.5).
Then, we compare the classification accuracy of models
learned using two variants of our algorithm: DPD-AC and
DPD-zCDP. As mentioned in Section 4.3, zCDP composi-
tion provides a tighter bound on the privacy loss compared
to the advanced composition theorem. Here we compare
them using some concrete values. The noise level can be
computed from the overall privacy loss ǫ, the sampling ra-
tio of each minibatch ν = S/N and the number of epochsE
(so the number of iterations is T = E/ν). For our MNIST
and DIGITS experiments, we set ν = 0.01, E = 200 and ν
= 0.05,E = 100, respectively. Then, we compute the value
of σ. For example, when ǫ = 0.5, the σ values are 10.88
for DPD-AC and 3.23 for DPD-zCDP on MNIST. We can
see from Figure 1(c) and Figure 1(f) that we get a much
lower noise by using the zCDP for a fixed the privacy loss
ǫ. Therefore, for our models with a total privacy budget
fixed to ǫ, the amount of noise added is smaller for zCDP,
and the test accuracy is higher. Figure 2(a) and Figure 2(b)
show the comparison results of DPD-AC and DPD-zCDP
methods when ǫ = 0.5 with NP model. Both results clearly
show that using the zCDP composition further helps in ob-
taining even more accurate results at a comparable level of
privacy.
Lastly, we compare our methods to the most related algo-
rithm proposed by Abadi et al. [Abadi et al., 2016] and the
case when no dropout is used. For the algorithm with no
dropout, we use SGLD to update the weights of the neural
network. We ran all the methods on MNIST and DIGITS
with varying ǫ. Table 1 reports the test accuracies of all
methods. The previous experiments have already demon-
strated that DPD-zCDP significantly improves the predic-
tion accuracy. These results also support it and show that
dropout improves the prediction accuracy especially when
the privacy budget is low.
Effect of the parameters: The classification accuracy in
neural networks depends on a number of factors that must
be carefully tuned to optimize the performance. For our
DP methods, these factors include the number of hidden
units, the number of iterations, the gradient clipping thresh-
old, the minibatch size and the noise level. In the previous
section, we compared the effect of different noise levels to
the classification accuracy. Here, we demonstrate the ef-
fects of the remaining parameters. We control a parameter
individually by fixing the rest as constant. For MNIST ex-
periments, we set the parameters as follows: 1000 hidden
units, minibatch size of 600, gradient norm bound of 3, ini-
tial learning rate of 0.1, 200 epochs and the privacy budget
ǫ to 1. The results are presented in Figure 2.
In non-private neural networks, using more hidden units is
often preferable and increases the prediction accuracy of
the trained model. For differentially private training, using
more hidden units leads more noise added at each update
due to the increase in the sensitivity of the gradient. How-
ever, increasing the number of hidden units does not always
decrease accuracy since larger networks are more tolerant
to noise. Figure 2(c) shows that accuracy is very close for
a hidden unit number in the range of [500, 2000] and peaks
at 1000.
The number of epochs E (so the number of iterations is
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Figure 1: Comparison of the test accuracies for ǫ = {10, 1, 0.5} and the NP case for (a) AC, b) zCDP compositions on
MNIST and (d) AC, e) zCDP compositions on DIGITS. (c) and (f) shows the σ value as a function of ǫ on MNIST and
DIGITS respectively.
Table 1: Comparison of the methods for ǫ = {10, 1, 0.5}. Bold values indicate the best results.
MNIST DIGITS
ǫ = 10 ǫ = 1 ǫ = 0.5 ǫ = 10 ǫ = 1 ǫ = 0.5
DPD-AC 0.9526 0.9187 0.8658 0.9341 0.9089 0.8521
DPD-zCDP 0.9718 0.9470 0.9205 0.9518 0.9367 0.9125
SGLD-zCDP (no dropout) 0.9581 0.9216 0.8952 0.9403 0.9187 0.8821
Abadi et al. [Abadi et al., 2016] 0.9720 0.9305 0.8965 0.9480 0.9265 0.9003
T = E/ν) needs to be sufficient but not too large. The
privacy cost in zCDP increases in proportion to
√
T and it
is more tolerable than DP. We tried several values in the
range of [50, 400] and observed that we obtained the best
results when E is between 100 and 200 for MNIST.
Tuning the gradient clipping threshold depends on the de-
tails of the model. If the threshold is too small, the clipped
gradient may point in a very different direction from the
true gradient. Besides, when we increase the threshold, we
add a large amount of noise to the gradients. In our experi-
ments, we tried C values in the range of [1, 6]. Figure 2(e)
shows that our model is tolerable to the noise up to C = 4,
then the accuracy decreases marginally.
Finally, we monitor the effect of the minibatch size. In
DP settings, choosing smaller minibatch size leads running
more epochs, however, the added noise has a smaller rel-
ative effect for a larger minibatch. Figure 2(f) shows that
relatively larger minibatch sizes give better results. Empir-
ically, we obtain the best accuracy when S is around 600
(so ν = S/N = 0.01). Due to space limitations, we only
present the results on MNIST data, the results on DIGITS
data have very similar behavior.
6 Conclusion
We introduced differentially private dropout (DPD) that
outputs privatized results in deep neural networks with ac-
curacy close to the non-privatemodel learning results, espe-
cially under reasonably strong privacy guarantees. To make
effective use of the privacy budget over multiple iterations,
we proposed to calculate the cumulative privacy cost by us-
ing zCDP. Then, we showed how to perform DPD in pri-
vate neural network training settings and illustrated the ef-
fectiveness of our algorithm on several benchmark datasets
for DNNs.
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Figure 2: (a) and (b) are the test accuracy results of DPD-AC and DPD-zCDP for ǫ = 0.5 on MNIST and DIGITS. (c), (d),
(e) and (f) show the effect of the model parameters on MNIST dataset.
One natural next step is to extend the approach to the dis-
tributed training of deep neural networks. The algorithm
proposed in the paper are generic and it can be applied to
any neural network model. We left its application to other
variants of neural networks such as convolutional and re-
current neural networks for future work.
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